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The Redistributive Properties of the Social Security Act of 1935 
Jordan Gagnon 
Abstract: This paper will evaluate the current theories of intent and functioning for the Social 
Security Act of 1935, and from there propose a hypothesis of the act as a distributive system 
functioning as redistributive from the start. It will analyze this through generated information 
and data from the United States Census Bureau. Three studies are analyzed to look at trends 
over twenty-five years of program action. One test on the national budget deficit and two tests on 
social security benefits as a percentage of poverty threshold and income. The findings portray 
trends in the early years of the program that could suggest a growing level of redistribution from 
the beginning of Social Security payouts in 1940. 
 
The Redistributive Properties of the Social Security Act of 1935 
In the twenty-first century, social security is synonymous with retirement or retirement 
benefits, and the current news around it is that social security is failing. The fund that feeds the 
program is drying up and without some hefty reforms the program will go under. This has 
prompted research into what the impact of losing social security would be. A survey created by 
the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP) showed only 8.7% of retirement age seniors 
as being in poverty with social security benefits while 43.6% of the same population would be in 
poverty without social security benefits (Romig, 2016). A deeper look into the realm of social 
security reveals why the program has not been mended. Scholars cannot decide on a solution 
because of the fact that no one can decide on the cause and purpose of the 1935 act that 
established the program. This paper will analyze the current theories available and then 
formulate a new hypothesis to answer to this question.  
 
Understanding the Bill 
The Social Security Act of 1935 established the first real social insurance program in the 
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United States. The most basic understanding of social security is that it established a retirement 
or old age pension that pays out benefits to those covered by the program at age sixty-five. 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt established the Committee of Economic Security chaired by 
Frances Perkins to create the bill (DeWitt, 2010). It then went to the 74th Congress to be 
reviewed by the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee before 
heading to the floor for debate (DeWitt, 2010). The bill was passed August 14, 1935 and the first 
payments began going out in 1940 (DeWitt, 2010). The passing of the initial act by Congress 
established the program with only limited benefits and coverage. The ten titles of the original bill 
only set up retirement benefits for those sixty-five and over, and disability benefits for the blind 
(Social Security History). From there it served as a cornerstone to be built upon. Numerous 
amendments to the act have added benefits such as disability and widow’s insurance, but the 
program has seen few changes in its basic function. It has been one of the longest running 
programs for the country over the last century and is one of only a few programs still standing 
from the group of legislation known as Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal. It is also the only 
piece of legislation from that era to maintain a largely unchanged basic feature throughout its 
entire lifetime. After its initial passing in 1935 there have been some amendments, and the three 
most significant came in 1939, 1950, and 1983 (Social Security History). The fact that there has 
only been three major amendments in over eighty years has made it a highly investigated field of 
study. The vast research surrounding the Social Security Act of 1935 has led to an immense 
amount of conflicting research and theories. Different scholars view the act extremely 
differently, and have many different theories for what the impact of social security has been. Due 
to this, there is no single dominating view of social security in how and why it was passed or 
structured in the way it was. The confusion comes from the founding structure of social security. 
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It was not designed as a true redistributive policy, such as a means tested program like Medicaid 
would feature. It was social insurance for every tax paying individual making it universal in 
reach. Even with all the research already done on the subject of the Social Security Act of 1935, I 
do not believe any theory has correctly analyzed and explained the question of why the Social 
Security Act was passed the way it was and what its true intentions were. While this question has 
been repeatedly studied the reason for the vast number of theories is because researchers cannot 
go back and ask FDR exactly what he was thinking. It is a question that needs some qualitative 
evidence that shows intention as well as empirical evidence. This paper will attempt to tackle 
both by analyzing the current theories and establishing where my hypothesis fits in on the 
spectrum. The current popular theories that tackle this question can fall into three groups: 
economic, racial, or political. While each group encompasses different theories featuring minor 
differences, they all follow a major outlying theory that fits the group.  
 
Literature Review 
The first group theory views the act as primarily involving the economics of the program. 
The encompassing idea here is known as the corporate liberal thesis. This looks at the Social 
Security Act as a testament to the capitalist structure of the United States’ system. This argument 
looks past the rhetoric of the act. Some researchers argue it as an inverse to the typical 
redistributive system. It is argued that it actually redistributes from the poor to the rich in the 
opposite direction (Ozawa, 1976). The more common view is that it offered little to no 
fundamental change in redistribution. The support for these claims comes from social security’s 
contributory principle and the requirement of labor force participation. The argument focuses on 
the construction of the Social Security Act of 1935 as being a tool by class-conscious capitalists, 
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manipulating rhetoric to pursue policies that strongly favored capitalism. This is along the same 
lines as a Keynesian economic theory. The act was more of a tool to stymie the growth of 
socialist policy for the future instead of a stepping stone toward socialist policy (Bernstein, 
1968). It helped businesses flourish by increasing the purchasing power of the retirement age 
population. Also, it had a positive effect on unemployment by removing the retirement age 
population out of the working force while still giving them the means to participate in a capitalist 
society as a consumer (Graebner, 1980). This is the base for the corporate liberal thesis for social 
security.  
When deeper analysis of these claims is done, this economic theory toward Social 
Security falls short. To analyze this, one must look beyond the Social Security Act of 1935 to the 
country’s majority view toward pension systems at the state level. At the time of Social 
Security’s passing, only one state, Wisconsin, had a pension system in place and functioning 
(Quadagno, 1984). Because of this, one must look at the systems used before social security in 
lieu of pension systems. Instead of statewide pension systems, most places within the United 
States had different versions of poor-law customs. These were almost all administered and 
financed locally, which caused for major variation from state to state and even county to county 
(Quadagno, 1984). The only exceptions to this were a few pensions that existed for teachers, 
pension benefits paid to veterans through the federal government, and a few pension systems 
within private industries (Graebner, 1980, Quadagno, 1984, Ikenberry, 1987). Old age pensions 
were seen to have a series of undesirable effects. The most impactful being the perception of a 
pension system causing, “a heavy tax burden on the industries of the state that would put them at 
a disadvantage in competition with neighboring states unburdened by a pension system. In 
addition, pensions would reduce wages, destroy family cohesion, and would testify to the failure 
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of American economic and social institutions” (Report of the Massachusetts Commission on Old 
Age Pensions, Annuities, and Insurance, 1910). This helps highlight what could be taken as the 
conservative view of pension systems before the passing of the Social Security Act of 1935. 
Places in which pension laws were passed usually did so, despite fierce lobbying against them by 
industry (Quadagno, 1984). These lobbying efforts focused on anti-taxation rhetoric. The fear 
was in a pensions demand for an income tax, a manufacturer’s tax, or both (Quadagno, 1984).  
How can a federal old age pension system in the 1930’s be due to the idea of a corporate 
liberal thesis when class-conscious capitalists were always strictly opposed to any sort of 
contributory pension system in any documented proposal of the system beforehand? Although 
some monopoly manufacturers had begun to implement their own pension systems, upon 
investigation of the Committee on Economic Security, created by FDR, most non-monopoly 
manufactures were in favor of no legislation (Quadagno, 1984). This lack of historical context 
weighs heavily on the economic theory of social security. The history of conservative capitalists 
in the United States leads one to believe that they would not even show support for a 
contributory old age pension, much less develop one for their interests. Additionally, there are 
then many divisions within this thesis that give certain areas more importance, and cite slightly 
different factors for this belief.  
Other factions identify some of the same features of social security, but cite extremely 
different causation and impact. The racial theory for the Social Security Act of 1935 does this to 
an extreme. The racial theory for social security focuses its argument on a single, major 
provision of the act. It is the same provision that those in the economist camp view as evidence 
of a capitalist intention. The contributory principle required labor force participation. It did this 
while excluding farm and domestic laborers. The contributory principle is what makes the Social 
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Security Act of 1935 a distributive program by structure. It is that Social Security is tied to 
income, and the tax from one’s income is what makes a person eligible for benefits (Social 
Security History). From the Senate’s own estimation based off of the 1930 census, the Social 
Security Act excluded between twenty-one and twenty-two million workers in fields that left 
them out of the taxed labor pool (79 Cong. Rec. 9637, 1935). This would account for about 
seventeen percent of the United States population. The racial argument, which is also referred to 
as the southern compromise, is that this was done to exclude the majority of African-American 
workers, because in 1935, three-fifths of the black labor force fell into those categories 
(Quadagno, 1984). It followed the belief that this was a systematic and purposeful use of the 
legislation to enhance segregation. The argument does not see the program as strictly capitalistic, 
but instead redistributive in a different light. Scholars such as Quadagno and Lieberman see the 
social security act as transferring income from the African-Americans to the whites in power 
rather than the transfer of income from the wealthy to the poor (Davies, 1997, Lieberman, 1995). 
There is no argument as to whether or not the Social Security Act excluded three-fifths of the 
African-American working class. What makes this theory difficult is that it has been unable to 
prove any sort of intention. The intent of FDR and the 74th congress that passed the Social 
Security Act is just speculation for this theory. While the empirical data shows clear evidence 
that people were excluded, the argument weakens as social security began to age. These 
provisions of the act have been revised multiple times, with the first revision coming in 1939 a 
year before the first social security payment went out in 1940. For evidence, this theory must rely 
on the fact that the legislation got support from southern democrats, as well as southern 
democrats being on the committees to help form the bill. Also, the beliefs of the NAACP saw the 
provision as being racially discriminatory along with provisions in other New Deal legislation 
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(Davies, 1997).  
While this is one of the most prominent theories to the Social Security Act, it stumbles 
under close scrutiny. Larry DeWitt, a public historian with the Social Security Administration 
wrote a comprehensive paper addressing the 1935 Social Security Act’s decision to exclude 
agricultural and domestic workers. DeWitt addresses what the racial explanation for this is, but 
also looks deeper into the issue. He lays out the arguments of Lieberman, Gordon, and Davies 
and Derthick as the standard to identify the main points for a racial explanation. DeWitt breaks 
the racial argument into three major arguments. That it targeted a majority of African-American 
workers, that these exclusions were due to Southern factions of the Democratic Party who were 
responsible, and the choice did not reflect any other reasoning from congress (DeWitt, 2010). He 
compiled a comprehensive list of exactly all who were left out of the Social Security Act. 
Individuals were excluded from the program due to many different reasons, only two of which 
were because of agricultural or domestic work. It would have also reflected much more of a 
racial bias. According to DeWitt, “of the 21 million gainfully employed workers that the 
president’s Committee on Economic Security estimated were excluded from participation in the 
Social Security system, at least 15 million were white” (DeWitt, 2010). The conservative 
influence of Southern Democrats has also been exaggerated. Only six of the twenty-one 
members of the Senate’s Finance Committee were from Southern states, while only four of the 
eighteen members of the House Ways and Means Committee were from Southern states (DeWitt, 
2010). This also does not provide any distinction between the interests of different Southern 
political figures. A senator from a rural plantation district in the Mississippi Delta did not have 
the same interest as one from a textile dominated district in a border state such as Delaware 
(DeWitt, 2010). Combine this with evidence of resistance by employees and employers both 
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after domestic workers were brought under coverage in the 1950 amendments to Social Security, 
and the racial explanation collapses. DeWitt concludes from congressional debate records and 
testimonies that the exclusions were instead caused by Congress’ concern of putting undue 
burden upon the Treasury by covering individuals from whom it would be difficult to collect 
taxes (DeWitt, 2010). The racial explanation and theory for the Social Security Act of 1935 
collapses under intense scrutiny causing some scholars to look elsewhere for explanation. While 
these two are the most prominent working theories to the causation and intent of the Social 
Security Act of 1935, there is one other faction that needs recognition. The political camp has 
their own views on social security. 
The political camp is different in that it does not have a broad, engulfing theory. There 
are theories in this camp that have similar conclusions to other theories. For example Theda 
Skocpol and John Ikenberry produce a theory that resembles thoughts similar to those arguing 
for capitalist reasoning to social security from the economics camp. What makes it a political 
theory versus an economic theory is how they arrived there. They suggest that social security 
was a welfare, capitalist program established despite, “a federal state structure and political party 
system otherwise uncongenial to generous and nationally uniform public welfare efforts” 
(Ikenberry, 1987). This, like so many other theories we have looked at, rests on a presumption of 
intention. Ikenberry and Skocpol’s argument rests on the progressive agenda of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt and Francis Perkins as being the only agenda reflected in the Social Security Act of 
1935. While FDR did form the Committee on Economic Security (CES) to create the first 
proposal of a bill for social insurance legislation this was not the only party that weighed in. The 
American political system is more complex than that. The bill also passed through the House 
Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee before then going to the floor in 
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both houses for debate (DeWitt, 2010). To go along with this, if it was just Roosevelt’s and 
Perkins’ agenda, then the bill would have struggled to pass in Congress. This is the opposite of 
what occurred. The Social Security Act only spent 18 days in congress and passed 77 to 6 with 
twelve not voting in the Senate and passed 372 to 33 with twenty-five not voting in the House of 
Representatives (Social Security Administration). The bill had fairly overwhelming support from 
both sides of the aisle with little debate on both floors of Congress. This does not represent a bill 
reflecting the interests of only two individuals, regardless of how powerful they were. A modern 
political argument would be one such as Alan Jacobs. Jacobs’ theory focuses on the institutional 
aims of FDR and the 74th Congress. Like other social security theorists, Jacobs points to the 
foundation of the program and its heavy upfront costs for the first five years of the program. His 
theory for social security’s organization is that the creators made programmatic institutional 
choices in order to make social security a sustainable long term program (Jacobs 2009). While 
these choices left the policy vulnerable to challenges from different directions, he argues that this 
was not the concern behind these choices. His argument is that policies can also serve as a 
political institution after the establishing institution is gone. He says that when used as 
“intentional and strategic” the designs of a program can be used to constrain one’s rivals and 
successors over time (Jacobs 2009). Jacobs’ more accurate definition of a programmatic 
institution is, “a structural feature of an existing public program that influences the menu of 
policy options from which officeholders choose or the political costs and benefits associated with 
those options” (Jacobs 2009).  
Jacobs’ argument moves away from the social security system targeting either side of 
Roosevelt’s supporters. He uses the benefits for both the left and the right in the policy as 
evidence to FDR’s lack of a capitalist or socialist agenda. This leads him to his programmatic 
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institutional beliefs for the causation of the Social Security Act of 1935. The problem with 
Jacobs’ theory is that it is supported by very little evidence. Jacobs is taking what is a political, 
institutional idea that can only be recognized generations after the passing of legislation and 
suggesting that FDR used it consciously as a political tool. This theory is difficult to support due 
to a lack of evidence. There is no record of Roosevelt, Perkins, or anyone else saying something 
along these lines. The hardest thing to prove is intent, and that is exactly what Jacobs’ theory 
relies on. Jacobs fails to provide any evidence of FDR even having this tool in his political 
arsenal. There is no other instance that shows Roosevelt talking about the idea of programmatic 
institutions. This is a perfect example of the struggle within the political camp for social security 
theories. They usually rely on the intent or mindset of policy makers, which is difficult to show. 
For the one question over the Social Security Act of 1935 there are theories that cover a wide 
range of viewpoints. Each one of these theories fails to tell the entire story of the Social Security 
act or misses the mark completely. 
 
Social Security: An Alternative Hypothesis 
 While all of these theories are vastly different, they can all find some evidence within the 
Social Security Act. However, these theories do not focus on the most relevant evidence from the 
legislation. All of these theories view social security as a different form of policy. What none of 
them do is look at the political intention of social security as stemming from a policy goal. While 
the Social Security Act created a system of old age pensions that was universal to the entire 
taxed labor force, its creators and supporters at the time of its passing intended it to have the 
same outreach and impact as a redistributive property. I agree with Jacobs that the causation of 
the legislation can be traced to a political intention within the policy, but I disagree with what 
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this intention was. FDR and the 74th Congress were able to create legislation with mass appeal 
that would function as a redistributive property. For this to have any shot at being true, there 
must be evidence of this ideological belief at the creation of the legislation. This paper will 
establish this as a plausible hypothesis with evidence from the Congressional Record of the 
debates on the 1935 legislation. It will then analyze this hypothesis empirically with a three case 
study looking at the legislation’s redistributive nature at three different points in time, with focus 
around the points of major revision for the Social Security Act. The analysis will look at data on 
the Social Security Act’s effect on national poverty levels of the retirement age population. This 
will come together to form a comprehensive analysis of the causation of the Social Security Act 
of 1935 being linked to  political intent by the Congress to create a program that would have the 
impact of redistributive legislation without the actual structure of one. 
 
Congressional Record 
The Social Security Act had all the intention and goals of a redistributive program such 
as other New Deal legislation while actually being a universal program that is distributive and 
contributory. For this to be a plausible premise, there must be some record of political attitude 
toward a progressive and redistributive intention toward the Social Security Act. The 
congressional record of the floor debates can shed light onto the thoughts and beliefs of those in 
favor or opposed to the legislation. With only thirty-nine individuals voting against the bill, the 
few who spoke up in the debates provided little insight into the mindset of those who voted nay. 
Even more eye opening are the people who voted in favor for the bill, particularly because of the 
variety of individuals that supported the legislation. In analysis of the congressional record of the 
Senate debate I found interesting commentary between the two senators from Colorado. In the 
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floor debate Alva B. Adams, a Democrat from Colorado, raised a question on private insurance 
companies’ ability to provide policies with better economic outlooks than the bill was 
suggesting. In response to this was Edward P. Costigan, who was a Democrat from Colorado and 
a founding member of the Progressive Party with Theodore Roosevelt in 1912. He stated, “May I 
suggest from the able bodied senator from Colorado that the field with which we are now dealing 
is one in which the standard life-insurance companies have rarely issued policies or given the 
sort of assurances the Senator from Colorado is now indicating?” in regards to the target 
population of the bill (79 Cong. Rec. 9638, 1935). He then continues, “I may say it impresses me 
as of very slight consequence what the particular phraseology of these amendments is so long as 
the essential end is clear” (79 Cong. Rec. 9638, 1935). (For the record both Senators voted yay 
to the bill.) This provides record of a progressive ideology and interpretation present during the 
passing of the Social Security Act of 1935. Senator Costigan refers to an intended population as 
not being those who already have access to private old age pensions through private insurance 
providers. In the 1930’s, these private policies were rare and limited to higher economic classes 
within society. This serves as evidence of some sort of traditional redistributive ideology (from 
rich to poor) on the Social Security Act at the time of its passing. This serves as the foundation 
for a redistributive intent for social security while being a program that was not truly 
redistributive in form. The idea of Social Security as a redistributive program is not new. 
 This is not the first theory to view Social Security as redistributive. Different theories 
have seen the Social Security act as redistributive in a variety of ways that differ from the 
traditional form of redistributive. The traditional form is the distribution of wealth from those in 
higher economic classes to those in lower economic classes or the impoverished. Some scholars 
who are proponents of the economic corporate liberal thesis view the Social Security Act as 
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functioning as a redistributive program in the inverse of the traditional sense (Ozawa, 1976). 
This would mean that the program actually redistributes wealth from the poor to the rich. This is 
the extreme view of social security as a tool for conservative capitalists (Quadagno, 1984). There 
is no empirical evidence to show a redistribution of this pattern. The same goes for scholars who 
believe in the racial explanation for the Social Security Act. The argument that they make is that 
the Social Security Act redistributes along a racial continuum instead of the traditional economic 
status continuum. This is the claim that the Social Security Act redistributes wealth from 
African-Americans to whites (Ozawa, 1976). This claim, like the economic claim, shows no true 
empirical evidence that would support this. It is important to differentiate between the different 
forms of redistribution that are associated with the Social Security Act of 1935. For this working 
hypothesis we are dealing with a strictly traditional sense of the term. It is also important to note 
that this hypothesis is not alone in viewing the Social Security Act as traditionally redistributive.  
 
Experimental Design 
To look for this phenomenon in the Social Security Act of 1935, I will look at three 
different tests. The first of these tests will be at the national budget level. The test will be a 
simple comparison model between the national spending on social insurance programs, and the 
amount of national income from the Social Security program. It will be analyzed for general 
trends over time. The second test will be more complex, but will still be looking for trends over 
time. The second test will focus on social security benefits as a percentage of the poverty 
threshold, and of median income levels. Looking at these two trends over time will hopefully 
provide insight on the redistributive properties and trends of the Social Security Act of 1935 in 
the early years of the program. 
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 For the Social Security Act of 1935 to show functioning that would be representative of a 
redistributive program, it must show some poverty alleviating effect in the first twenty years of 
the program’s existence. Social Security benefits first began going out in 1940 and have 
continued ever since. Research has shown redistributive properties in Social Security in modern 
times, but little research has been done in the early years of Social Security. This is because there 
is limited data for that time in American history. A perfect example of this is that the United 
States Census Bureau did not create and begin to take data on the poverty threshold until 1959. 
The only records kept from that period of history come from the United States Census for those 
years. The census did not keep the data for the exact records that this type of research would 
demand. This makes case selection tricky in this situation. The research is limited to the 
available data which frankly is not much. This also creates an unpreventable selection bias in my 
cases due to the fact I must select based off available data. The best case scenario would be if the 
study was able to analyze this data yearly for the first twenty-five years or so of the programs 
benefit payouts. This would not be a large case selection, but it would be enough to give the 
answers needed. The problem with this is that yearly data is not available for all of my research. 
This will only work for one of the three tests that will be looked at. For the test on national 
spending towards social insurance programs, I am able to look at yearly data ranging from 1940 
through 1970.  
For this test I will look at all thirty years, in search of trends over time. For the second 
test that will be completed, I am unable to use the same case selection. The second test looking at 
social security benefits as a percentage of the poverty threshold and as a percentage of average 
income will be much more limited. I am limited by the data available through the United States 
Census Bureau as well as the data available for social security benefit payouts, and because of 
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this I am only capable of looking at the data for every five years. The test will look at every five 
years, beginning in 1940 and ranging until 1965, resulting in six data points. It does this with 
some limited availability on information for some variables which will be elaborated on more in 
the methods and results sections.  
 
Method 
 As mentioned earlier, the research will consist of three tests. The tests will be fairly basic 
comparative studies. The focus will be the original signing of the Social Security Act of 1935, 
and all of the comparisons will remain within the act. The tests will make comparisons over time 
to identify any patterns or trends. The first test will look at social insurance spending on a 
national level. More specifically, it will look at the yearly amount spent in billions of United 
States dollars by the government to pay out social security benefits compared to the amount in 
billions of U.S. dollars received by the government as contributions for social insurance. This 
will analyze what the United States government is bringing in compared to what it is paying out 
every year from 1940 to 1970. Figures for this comparison are being taken from the United 
States Department of Commerce Bureau of the Census, and all of the figures used have been 
configured and published by the bureau. The figures used will be coming straight from the 
Bicentennial Edition of the Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970 that 
was published by the Bureau of the Census in September of 1975. The figures used for this test 
come from part one of this two part publication. Specifically, the data has been collected from 
the Personal Income and Outlay: 1929-1970 chart on page 272 of the document. For this test, we 
kept the data in the same format used by the bureau (billions of US dollars). These numbers were 
compared by year looking at the difference between national funds received and national benefits 
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paid out. The results have been put into an overlapping line chart to show trends over time for 
each individually, as well as in comparison.  
The second test will be looking at Social Security Benefits as a percentage of the poverty 
threshold as well as of median incomes. The figures used for Social Security benefits are the 
national averages for social security benefit payments for each individual year. Due to the data 
for pre-1957 only being available in five year increments, the test looks at the benefits for 1940, 
1945, 1950, 1955, 1960, and 1965. National averages for benefits were used due to the nature of 
social security benefits. Social security benefits are calculated for each individual, based off of 
what one has paid into the system and for how long. Due to this case by case specificity, national 
averages were used for comparison. The figures for the national averages of social security 
benefit payouts come from the Social Security Administration’s “Social Security Bulletin: 
Annual Statistical Supplement”. These figures were presented as monthly averages, so for the 
purposes of this test I converted the averages to yearly averages.  
The first comparison of these averages proposes an enormous challenge. The poverty 
threshold was created by the Bureau of the Census to provide an empirical measure to classify 
individuals within the population as being impoverished or not. The threshold was set as being 
three times the cost of the minimum nutritional diet for different demographics. The threshold 
created separate figures for age, sex, and family size. The comparison with the national poverty 
threshold poses a challenge due to the fact that the poverty threshold was not created and tracked 
until 1959. Due to the purpose of this research being to analyze the early years of the Social 
Security Act, I could not start my comparison nineteen years past when the first benefits were 
paid out. This forced me to create my own poverty threshold measure for years prior to 1959. 
Instead of using Bureau of the Census data on national food costs to try and build my own 
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poverty threshold measure for each individual year from scratch, I took the existing poverty 
threshold figures and worked backwards. I did this by using the United States Department of 
Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Price Indicator (CPI) inflation calculator. What this 
tool does is take a dollar value from a selected year and compares it to the spending power of 
another selected year by providing the equivalent dollar value for the selected year. In simpler 
terms, it would show, as an example, what $100 dollars from 1980 would be equivalent to in 
2000 and vice versa. What I did was take the poverty threshold figure for a retirement age 
individual (65 and over) from 1959 and calculate the equivalency for each year prior to 1959. 
This worked on the belief that general inflation rates would be fairly consistent with the inflation 
rate of food and agriculture over time.  
To test the validity of this process, I compared the real poverty threshold figures with 
calculated poverty threshold figures going forward from 1959. The results from these 
comparisons can be seen in Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2. The results of the test comparison led me 
to continue with this as an acceptable mode to create poverty threshold figures for pre-1959. I 
then used simple division to calculate the average social security benefit payout as a percentage 
of the calculated poverty threshold for each year. I did this same comparison process with figures 
for the national median income for each individual year. The figures came from the Bureau of 
the Census’s Current Population Reports on Consumer Income for each individual year. The 
process was again repeated with figures for the national average income for an individual 65 
years and over and for the national average income for a head of household 65 years and over for 
each year. These figures also came from the Current Population Reports on Consumer Income 
published by the Bureau of the Census for each individual year. The results for all these figures 
along with the calculated percentages can be seen in Table 2. They have been placed together on 
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a scatter plot with linear lines of best fit to show general trends over time of the calculated 
percentages, which can be seen in Figure 3.  
 
Results 
 The results for the first test can be seen in Table 1, and in the form of a line graph in 
Figure 1. The difference between the amount spent by the national government to pay out social 
security benefits and the amount of contributions they took in started with the government in the 
positive. They were taking in more in contributions than they were paying out in benefits. The 
peak of this positive difference came in 1944-45 when the government took in two billion more 
than they paid out in benefits. This difference went on the decline, and by 1955-56 the difference 
had shrunk to almost nothing. This trend continued and the government began to pay out more in 
social security benefits than they were receiving in contributions for social insurance. This 
deficit, which began as 0.6 billion dollars in 1957, would continue to increase to 2.3 billion in 
1959 and continue along this path. The deficit ultimately reached 10.5 billion by 1970. For a 
complete breakdown of the change by year, reference Table 1.  
 The second test’s results are less clear. Average yearly social security benefits as a 
percentage of the average national income remained fairly consistent. There was very little 
variation from the initial figures in 1940 with benefits totaling about 21% of the national average 
income. Beside one outlier in 1950 where the percentage dropped to around 13%, social security 
benefits as a percentage of average income held between 19%-22% and leveled at 20% at the end 
in 1965. The test of social security benefits as a percentage of poverty threshold numbers did not 
show this same lack of variation. The initial figures from 1940 show social security benefits as 
being about 40% of the poverty threshold. There again is a dip in 1950 with the percentage 
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dropping to 32%, but then the numbers begin to rise. The figures jump to 64% in 1955 and 
continue to rise to about 74% in 1965. The test of the national average income for an individual 
65 years and over has some gaps in information. Average income by age was not tracked by the 
Bureau of the Census until 1950, so the figures for 1940 and 1945 are missing. The figures start 
in 1950 where the percentage starts at 58%. Social security benefits as a percentage of individual 
income then begins to rise. It jumps to 79% in 1955 and then continues to rise all the way to 84% 
in 1965. The final test is looking at head of households 65 years and over, but these figures are 
incomplete. The data only exist for the years 1945, 1950, and 1965. The percentage started in 
1945 at 29% and rose to 43% in 1965. This list is relatively incomplete though. All of the data 
for the second test can be seen in Table 2 and the percentages can be viewed for trends over time 
in the scatter plot in Figure 3. 
 
Conclusion 
 The purpose of these two studies and this research has been to test the validity of my 
hypothesis on the creation and functioning of the Social Security Act of 1935. This hypothesis 
was that the Social Security Act of 1935 was passed purposefully as a distributive system that 
would function as a redistributive system over time. In order to validate this hypothesis, one 
would need to see the system becoming more redistributive over time from the very beginning of 
the act before major amendments further down the road. To look at the redistributive nature of 
social security I used two major studies. The first was a basic comparison of the total dollar 
amount that the government spent on social security benefit payouts compared to the total 
amount of contributions that the national government took in for social insurance. The idea here 
was that, for the program to function in a way matching its distributive design, the difference 
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should stay relatively the same, and the contributions into the government should usually be 
equivalent or greater than the payments out. Instead of this the results showed a different trend. 
By looking at Figure 1, we can see a trend that starts out in this matter but gradually evens out 
around 1955 and then begins to show an increasing deficit. These results support my hypothesis 
that the act was not functioning as a distributive program like how it was designed. These results 
by themselves do not necessarily show that the program was becoming more redistributive, but 
they do not disprove the hypothesis either.  
The purpose of the second test was to actually show some sort of redistributive nature. To 
show this, the second test would need to show some sort of consistency within the program for 
all people, due to its distributive design, while showing changing trends in the categories for the 
poverty threshold and the individual income of those 65 years and over. The actual results show 
something similar to this. When looking at social security benefits as a percentage of the national 
average income, we see extraordinarily little change. The percentage held right around 20% for 
over the span of 25 years. This portrays the distributive design of the program. What the 
distributive design does not explain is the trends seen within the poverty threshold and individual 
income comparison.  
Both of these results show trends that steadily climbed throughout the 25 years I 
analyzed. It is worth mentioning that 1950 served as an outlier in each case showing a slight 
decrease before rising again. This is yet to be explained, but I believe it may be a result of the 
post war period. What these rising percentages are truly portraying is that social security benefits 
were rising faster than the poverty threshold numbers and individual income for people of 
retirement age (reference Figure 3). This means social security benefits were having a growing 
impact on those retirement age individuals around the poverty line. This helps support my claim 
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for the Social Security Act being distributive but functioning in redistributive ways. Results such 
as these cannot be explained by the other working theories. In fact it portrays the opposite of 
Ozawa’s economic theory on it redistributing in the opposite direction (Ozawa, 1976). I believe 
that the results support the validity of my hypothesis. With that being said, there are limitations 
to my research. The first major limitation is that the intent of the 74th congress is impossible to 
prove. The study itself is also limited by the available information for the time period. This is not 
only limiting to my current research, but also any future extensions of this research. This should 
not undermine the research done here. I believe this study has shown enough support for this 
hypothesis to be strongly considered when looking at the creation and functioning of the early 





















    
1941 0.1 0.8 0.7 
1942 0.1 1.2 1.1 
1943 0.2 1.8 1.6 
1944 0.2 2.2 2 
1945 0.3 2.3 2 
1946 0.4 2 1.6 
1947 0.5 2.1 1.6 
1948 0.6 2.2 1.6 
1949 0.7 2.2 1.5 
1950 1 2.9 1.9 
1951 1.9 3.4 1.5 
1952 2.2 3.8 1.6 
1953 3 4 1 
1954 3.6 4.6 1 
1955 4.9 5.2 0.3 
1956 5.7 5.8 0.1 
1957 7.3 6.7 -0.6 
1958 8.5 6.9 -1.6 
1959 10.2 7.9 -2.3 
1960 11.1 9.3 -1.8 
1961 12.6 9.6 -3 
1962 14.3 10.3 -4 
1963 15.2 11.8 -3.4 
1964 16 12.5 -3.5 
1965 18.1 13.4 -4.7 
1966 20.8 17.7 -3.1 
1967 25.7 20.5 -5.2 
1968 30.3 22.8 -7.5 
1969 33 26.3 -6.7 



























































H of H 
65&over 
           
1940 $22.71 $272.52 $1,299.00 21% $679.31 40% - - - - 
1945 $25.11 $301.32 $1,575.00 19% $873.40 34% - - $1,024.00 29% 
1950 $31.14 $373.62 $2,891.00 13% $1,169.39 32% $646.00 58% $1,474.00 25% 
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